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1 Introduction
The Italian process of decentralisation that began after the financial and political crises
of the early 1990s and the renewal of political institutions of those years provide the
primary motivation for this paper. In 1995, new regional elections were held under a new
electoral law, which replaced the previous proportional system with a new ststem based
on majority rule and which also favoured the establishment of a presidential regime in
regional governments. Secondly, while health care expenditures, along with part of the
decision-making powers, have been allocated at the regional level since the establishment
of regions at the end of 1970s, revenues have been characterised by a decentralisation
process only during the 1990s. The most important reform occured in 1998 when new
regional tax revenues replaced many of the conditional intergovernmental grants. The
political renewal that involved all regional governments in 1995 and the 1998 reform of
the funding system of the Italian health care sector are two important events that can be
used to assess the impact of decentralisation and electoral accountability on government
efficiency.
The main intention of both reforms was to increase the accountability of the regional
public authorities. Hence, the main question that this paper will attempt to answer is
whether the 1998 tax reform, along with the 1995 renewal of political institutions, had
any effect on the efficiency of health care sector in Italy. According to the new political
economy approach to fiscal decentralisation, some improvements in efficiency should be
expected because, when both management and financial responsibility rest in the hands of
the same local officials, less information asymmetry should affect the principal agent game
between citizens and regional governments. Moreover, given the new electoral system,
citizens will have a better opportunity to judge the performance of sub-national officials,
thereby motivating the latter to provide better services.
The empirical strategy is to treat the 1995 and 1998 reforms as exogenous policy
variations in order to estimate their impact on the efficiency of the health care sector. To
that end, each regional government will be treated as a decision making unit that provides
health care services. Two main methodologies will be applied - Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) and Panel Data Stochastic Frontier Models (SFM). Both methodologies will be
applied to the Italian health sector using a longitudinal dataset, including financial and
health care data disaggregated at the regional level for the fifteen year period of 1991 -
2005. The results of the empirical models confirm the expected positive effect of both
policy variations on government efficiency with both methodologies. However, the 1998
tax reform exhibited an ambiguous and much weaker effect on government efficiency
than did the 1995 electoral reform. Further, both methodologies enable the regional
governments’ technical efficiency in the provision of health care services to be evaluated.
In general, the south appears to be less efficient than the rest of the country, and a clear
increase in efficiency can be observed only after 1995 all over the country.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the change that
interested regional political institutions in 1995 and the main aspects of the 1998 reform
of the health care funding system. Section 3 provides a summary of the theoretical and
empirical literature on the economic effects of political institutions and decentralisation
on the quality of government. The description of the dataset is presented in Section 4
followed by an analysis of the empirical models in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 reports
the main results. Section 7 presents the conclusions.
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2 1995 regional elections and 1998 tax reform
According to the Italian Constitution there are five tiers of government: metropolitan
areas, municipalities, provinces, regions, and central government. Health care is the most
important function of regional governments and according to 2005 figures, almost 98%
of health care expenditure is allocated at regional level and it represents more than 50%
of total regional budget expenditure. In this area central government legislation enacts
general principles, and regional governments can pass laws inside this framework.
In February, 1995, two months before the regional elections, the central government
introduced a new regional electoral system1. This reform completed the renewal that
involved the electoral systems of all levels of government.2 The main issue in the parlia-
mentary debate was the proportion of seats to be assigned by a majority method. This
indicated the desire to change the previous simple proportional system to a new system
in order to stimulate electoral accountability of regional politicians following the political
crisis that involved all levels of governments in the early 1990s.3 Under the new elec-
toral rules, 20% of the seats in the regional parliaments will be assigned by the majority
method, sufficient to guarantee the formation of the government by the winning coalition
and to create a bipolar political space. Moreover, under the new electoral system, the
names of the candidates, who compete for the presidency, appeared, for the first time,
on the ballots as heads of the electoral lists. As a result, beginning in 1995, the form of
regional governments evolved towards a presidential regime, although it was only in 1999
that the direct election of the heads of the regional governments was formally introduced.4
In 1998 a substantial part of intergovernmental grants earmarked for the health care
sector has been replaced by two new regional taxes. First IRAP5, a value added tax on
productive activities that applies to companies, private and public entities and commercial
and non-commercial activities. It is levied on the net value of the production derived in
each region; its standard rate at present is 3.9% and regional government can increase or
decrease it by up to 1% [Longobardi, 2005]. According to 2005 figures IRAP represented
22% of total regional budget revenues. Second a regional additional personal income tax
whose amount was around 4% of total regional revenues in 2005. At present its standard
tax rate is 0.9% and each regional government can increase it up to 1.4%. In 2005, these
two taxes financed almost 40% of total health expenditure. Figure 1 shows the increase
of the incidence of regional tax revenues in the total financial resources earmarked for
the health sector. At the beginning of the 1990s they accounted for something like 2%,
and after 1998 they amounted to something like 50%, a substantial change that can be
interpreted as a structural break.
1Legge n. 43/1995.
2In 1993, the direct election of the mayor and the president of the province revolutionised the local
electoral systems. In 1994, after the referendum of the previous year, the election of members of the
national parliament was held under a new majority system, which replaced the previous proportional
system.
3During those years, the entire political class underwent a change as a result of "Tangentopoli",
the system of corruption that was uncovered by a nationwide, Italian, judicial investigation of political
corruption named "Mani pulite" (Italian for "clean hands"). Mani pulite began in February, 1992 and
led to the demise of the so-called First Republic, resulting in the disappearance of the parties that had
led the political scene since the post-war period.
4Legge Costituzionale n. 1/1999.
5Imposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive (Regional Tax on Productive Activities).
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Figure 1: Percentage of regional own tax revenues in relation to total current regional rev-
enues earmarked for health sector, overall average across regions, year 1989-2005. Source
ISSiRFA-CNR [2008].
It is important to notice that because of the influence wielded by central government
only slight changes have been introduced by regional governments to the standard rates.
Therefore, most of the variability registered in the tax revenue across regions can be
explained by the "income gap" between the south and the north-central parts of the
peninsula rather than by differences in the fiscal polices adopted by regional governments.6
The average 2005 per capita GDP in the south of the country is less than 60% of the
average of that in the north and less than 70% of the average of that in the central part.
As a result, scepticism spread about the possibility that the tax reform could stimulate
the electoral accountability of local politicians in such a way as to affect positively the
efficiency of regional government.
In conclusion it is important to notice that IRAP and the regional additional personal
income tax were introduced by central government provision at the same time in all
regions. Similarly, the new electoral system was decided at central level, and elections
were held on the natural expiry of the regional governments in office. Therefore, the
1998 tax reform as well as the 1995 electoral reform and the subsequent ballot can be
considered as exogenous policy variations, i.e. unrelated to the decision-making power of
regional governments.
3 Effect of decentralisation and political institutions on
government efficiency
6According to 2005 figures, revenues produced by the new regional taxes in the northern and central
regions financed 48% and 37% respectively of the total health expenditures. In the southern regions,
they financed only 23% which means that most of the health care expenditures in the southern regions
are covered by grants from the central government. Conversely per capita health expenditure results
evenly distributed across the three macro regions, according to 2005 figures 1529, 1673, and 1476 euros
respectively in the north, centre and south.
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The main argument that this paper seeks to resolve is whether the 1995 new electoral
rules and 1998 tax reform have stimulated the accountability of local politicians, which,
in turn, might have positively affected the quality of regional governments. Seabright’s
seminal paper [Seabright, 1996] gives to accountability the precise meaning of electoral
accountability since it is defined in terms of the probability that welfare levels of a given
jurisdiction determine the election of the government. Lockwood [2005], however, remarks
that if the concept of accountability is defined broadly, it will be difficult to distinguish it
from preference-matching. Therefore, it has been proposed that the concept of account-
ability be characterised more precisely, either with the degree to which institutions allow
the government to divert rents, or with the degree to which institutions allow special
interest groups to distort government decision-making by lobbying.7
As reported above, the 1995 electoral reform favoured the transition from a propor-
tional system to a majoritarian system, as well as the establishment of a presidential
regime. Then, as indicated in Figure 1, the level of fiscal decentralisation increased dra-
matically after the 1998 tax reform. The literature identifies different mechanisms by
which political institutions and fiscal decentralization may stimulate electoral account-
ability bringing about increased efficiency.
Theoretical models that compare proportional and majoritarian systems (see Persson
and Tabellini [2000], Chapters 8 and 9) show that majoritarian systems can affect electoral
accountability in both directions, either increasing or decreasing the possibility of rent
diversion by politicians. In models of pre-election politics, where candidates are assumed
to make binding promises, there is more intense electoral competition among candidates
in majoritarian elections. This reduces the possibility of rent diversion by politicians and
stimulates their elecoral accountability. Conversely, in the models of post-election politics,
where politicians’ promises cannot be enforced and the incumbent needs to please only
a minimum winning coalition of voters in order to be reappointed, majoritarian elections
involve more intense competition only among voters to be included in that minimum
winning coalition. This will imply higher rents for politicians that corresponds to less
electoral accountability.
With regard to the form of government, the theoretical models that compare pres-
idential and parliamentary regimes (see Persson and Tabellini [2000] chapter 10) show
that presidential regimes can cope better with the agency problem between voters and
politicians due to the clearer separation of powers. This brings lower taxes and greater ac-
countability. As a result, presidential regimes are unambiguously associated with smaller
governments and less waste than parliamentary regimes.
According to the principal agent models of electoral accountability (one stream within
the literature on the second-generation theory of fiscal federalism), fiscal decentralisation
can affect government efficiency in a positive way [Besley and Case, 1995, Besley and
Smart, 2007, Bordignon et al., 2004, Hindriks and Lockwood, 2008]. In these models,
the electorate are the principals and politicians are the agents. The presence of asym-
metric information between them can be seen as the main reason why the government’s
performance is inefficient. The crucial point here is that fiscal decentralisation can create
an incentive to reduce rent diversion and/or the influence of lobbies, leading to a higher
probability of re-election through two main forms of competition among local govern-
7In the continuation we will consider accountability more in terms of rent diversion, for the lobbing
argument you can consider Bardhan and Mookerjee [2000], Bordignon et al. [2003], Redoano [2003] and
Ruta [2006].
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ments. The first is tax competition, which occurs when local governments compete over
tax rates in order to attract tax base8. The second is yardstick competition, which occurs
when voters can compare tax policies and levels of public-good provision that have been
adopted by officials in other regions with those offered in their own jurisdiction and use
their ballots as a vote on the performance of their incumbent, relative to the incumbents
in other regions.
Persson and Tabellini [2005] (chapter 7), using a cross-section of around 70 countries,
provide empirical evidence of the effect of majoritarian electoral systems and presidential
regimes on rent extraction (measured in terms of perceived corruption by public officials)
and productivity (measured in terms of labour and total factor productivity). Their
results are grenerally in line with the theory. Presidentialism has a negative effect on
rent extraction and favours productivity, particularly in the case of greater democracy.
Majoritarian systems unambiguously discourage corruption and foster productivity only
when associated with a ballot structure that enables the election of a high percentage of
legislators outside of the party list.
In most of the recent empirical literature, the effect of fiscal decentralisation is es-
timated by using a cross-sectional dataset of a wide range of developed and developing
countries. Usually, the reduced-form approach is followed. Hence, measures of general
government performance (e.g., the perceived corruption or indicators of the output and/or
quality of the service in sectors like health care and education) are regressed over measures
of fiscal decentralisation like the ratio of local public expenditures over general government
expenditures. Most of the empirical evidence attests to the positive effect of fiscal de-
centralisation on government efficiency [Faguet, 2004, Fisman and Gatti, 2000], although
there are some exceptions (e.g., Treisman [2000]).
In order to assess the impact of fiscal decentralisation on efficiency, Barankay and
Lockwood [2007] advocate the need to estimate the decentralisation’s effect in a model
that mimics the production function of government activities using longitudinal data-
sets. To support their criticism, a model of the education system’s production function
has been estimated by means of panel data from Swiss cantons during the period of 1982
to 2000. Their empirical results strongly support the concept that decentralisation has a
positive impact on efficiency of the education system. Following the same idea, but using
a different methodology, Adam et al. [2008] identified the effect of fiscal decentralisation
using a "two-stage approach". In the first stage, data envelopment analysis of a panel
of 21 OECD countries for the 1970 to 2000 period was used to compute country-specific
efficiency indices. In the second stage, country-specific efficiency indices were regressed
on an extensive set of alternative fiscal decentralisation measures. Again, their results
strongly support the evidence of a positive and significant effect of decentralisation on
government efficiency.
The empirical strategy, therefore, is to treat the 1995 change in the regional political
institutions and the 1998 tax reform as two exogenous policy variations in order to evaluate
their individual and joint effect on the technical efficiency of the regional health care
systems. In line with the previous empirical literature, a reduced form relationship is
estimated, since we do not have direct evidence of a reduction in rent diversion or lobbing
8In the spirit of the Leviathan hypothesis [Brennan and Buchanan, 1980] tax competition should reduce
local government taxing power, improving voters welfare only if officials are rent-seeking. Otherwise, the
"race to the bottom", (reduction of the tax rate) would have a high probability of reducing social welfare
due to an undersupply of public goods.
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activity. Unlike Barankay and Lockwood [2007] and Adam et al. [2008] the impact of
the policy change is evaluated by estimating a frontier production function by both a
parametric (stochastic frontier models) and nonparametric approach (data envelopment
analysis).
4 The dataset
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) and panel data stochastic frontier models (SFM) will
be used to measure the effect of the two policy variations on efficiency of the Italian
health care sector using a longitudinal dataset made up of financial and health care data
disaggregated at regional level between 1991 and 2005.9 Each regional government will
be treated as a decision making unit that provides health care services on the behavioural
assumption that each of them operates in order to maximise the output given the inputs.
Five of the twenty Italian regions (the two main islands and three border regions in the
north)10 are not directly comparable with the others because of their higher degree of fiscal
and decision-making decentralisation and because their electoral system was not affected
by the 1995 reform, therefore these five regions will be excluded from the dataset. As
a result, the cross-sectional dimension will be composed of the remaining fifteen regions,
that can be grouped into three macro-regions, north, centre, and south according to their
geographical position and taking into account the socio-economic divide between southern
regions and the rest of the country.11
Table 1: Analysis of variance - regressors and dependent variables
Variables overall Std. Dev. No. of obs.
mean overall between within i t
Output variable
life expectancy life 78.79 (years) 1,60 0.61 1.48 15 15
neonatal mortality (one month) mort 12.66 (no. / 10000) 4.66 2.12 4.16 15 15
Inputs variables
outpatient clinics inp 27.70 (no./100000) 10.31 9.61 4.44 15 15
emergency services inp2 7.30 (no./100000) 6.35 6.50 0.83 15 15
Fiscal decentralisation variables
dummy = 1 from 1998 dec (dummy) 15 15
Per capita regional own tax rev. tax 372.44 (e) 363.51 114.43 346.22 15 15
Reg. own tax rev./ courrent rev. dect 23.25 (%) 22.12 7.42 20.91 15 15
Electoral variable
dummy = 1 form 1995 elect (dummy) 15 15
Other environmental variables
Per capita real GDP gdp 20,975 (e) 5,328 5,169 1,826 15 15
Per capita households health exp. hexph 390.42 (e) 99.18 75.56 66.69 15 15
Dependancy ratio dep 49,29 (%) 3.89 3.22 2.34 15 15
9Our dataset is a perfectly balanced panel data and the dimensions of the panel are N = 15 and
T = 15 or T = 14 when lags are used as instruments for endogenous variables.
10Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Valle d’Aosta.
11North: Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Liguria, Emilia Romagna. Centre: Toscana, Marche, Umbria,
Lazio, Abruzzo. South: Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria.
7
Francesco Porcelli - Decentralisation and government efficiency. Evidence form the Italian health care sector. 8
Output and input variables
The identification of the output of the health system is quite a difficult issue because
the effectiveness of the health service should be measured from a number of aspects;
for example, the increase in the length and quality of life, equity of access to services
etc., which means that just one indicator may not be an appropriate measure of output.
The composite indicator elaborated by the World Health Organisation [WHO, 2000] has,
however, been criticised on several grounds by Hakkinen and Joumard [2007], and many
analyses of the health expenditure effectiveness have used only life expectancy or mortality
indices as outcome variables [Afonso and Ammar, 2005, Or, 2000]. In their assessment
of efficiency in the health sector across 191 countries Evans et al. [2000] measured the
outcome in terms of Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy (DALE), an indicator of healthy
life expectancy that differs from the "pure" life expectancy or mortality indices in that
it takes into account the quality of life other than its length. Recently, a report by the
Italian government [Bellini et al., 2001] aimed at developing a system of indicators for
the evaluation of the performance of the health care system in different dimensions. On
the basis of the action also taken in this direction by other developed countries, the main
conclusion of the report is that an all-inclusive index able to measure the performance of
the system alone does not exist and that the most suitable indicators are, at the moment,
life expectancy (at birth or at age 75), DALE, and mortality indices (mainly infant and
neonatal).
Since DALE disaggregated at regional level did not cover the entire time-series di-
mension, life expectancy at birth12 and neonatal mortality13 have been chosen as output
measures. When the production frontier is estimated by a data envelopment analysis,
which does not require a particular functional form to be specified, the results are quite
robust to the choice of the output measure. Conversely, in the stochastic frontier ap-
proach, the functional form of the production function needs to be specified. Further, in
the case of life expectancy, the data generating process can be approximated quite well
by a simple Cobb-Douglas production function, whereas in the case of neonatal mortality,
a more flexible trans-log functional form seems to be required. The problem is that the
larger number of parameters necessary in the latter specification of the production func-
tion is not compatible with the actual sample size. Therefore, unlike data envelopment
analysis, only life expectancy is considered as an output measure in the stochastic frontier
approach.
Figure 2 reports, by macro region, average life expectancy and neonatal mortality
registered in three different periods: (1) 1991-1995, before the electoral reform, (2) 1996-
1998, after the electoral reform, but before the tax reform, (3) 1998-2005, after the tax
reform. As we can see, both measures increased in each of the three periods. That is, they
exhibit sufficient time variation to be used as dependent variables. This is confirmed by
Table 1 in which the reported "within" standard deviations are one year and a half and
more than four units per 10,000 newborns. On the other hand, both measures exhibit
little "between" variations among regions. In fact, in Table 1 the "between" standard
12Life expectancy is the average number of years of life remaining at a given age and is computed
separately for men and women. Therefore, male and female life expectancies have been averaged by male
and female populations in order to obtain a single value.
13Neonatal mortality is the number of neonates, who die during the first month of life, per 10.000
Newborns. In a developed country, is a better measure than infant mortality where the numerator of the
ratio is the number of children who die during the first year of life.
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deviation is roughly half of the "within" variation in both cases. As explained in detail
in Section 6, this aspect may inflate the estimated general level of efficiency in the health
care sector, but does not undermine the validity of comparisons across time and space.
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Figure 2: Output variables by macro-region across three period in time: 1991-1995, 1996-
1998, 1999-2005. Source ISTAT [2008].
Inputs can be measured in physical terms (no. of doctors, hospital beds, etc.) and/or
in financial terms (health care spending). Since either DEA or SFM will be used to
estimate technical efficiency, inputs will be considered only in physical terms.14 With
regard to data availability, the number of public outpatient clinics and laboratories per
100,000 inhabitants (public or private structures financed by government funds) has been
used as a measure of capital. Then, the number of emergency services carried out per
100,000 inhabitants, has been used as a measure of labour. Table 1 shows that, on
average, there are almost 28 outpatient clinics per 100,000 inhabitants and more than
seven services per 100,000 inhabitants are carried out on average each year. Moreover, in
both cases, we observe a greater "between" variation that reflects a substantial difference
in the way regional governments employ resources. Figure 3 shows that southern regions
employ more inputs than does the rest of the country. Therefore, different levels of
efficiency among regions will be driven by the input side. The smaller variations observed
over time, instead, suggest that different levels of efficiency over the years will be driven
mainly by the output side.
Finally, inputs can be correlated with the idiosyncratic error term. Therefore, lagged
input variables have been used as instrumental variables, and in order to provide overiden-
tification, the instruments will include, separately, either the number of "public" outpa-
tient clinics and laboratories per 100,000 inhabitants or the number of "private" outpatient
clinics and laboratories per 100,000 inhabitants that are financed by public funds.
14This choice does not allow to expand the evaluation of efficiency also to the financial side of the
system because to that end we need to compute allocative efficiency estimating a cost frontier rather
than a production frontier, this exercise is left to further extensions due to the higher amount of data
required.
9
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Figure 3: Input variables by macro-region across three period in time: 1991-1995, 1996-
1998, 1999-2005. Source ISTAT [2008].
Environmental variables
Environmental variables (EV)15 are variables that influence the output level and efficiency
but are out of the control of the producers. They can be subdivided in two main categories.
First policy variables, that will be used to capture the effect of the two policy variations.
Second non-controllable inputs, although one can think of this last group of EVs as a
classical set of control variables, they are important in accounting for those environmental
factors that might affect, and also explain, regional performances together with policy
variations.
Figure 1 clearly shows a structural break in the funding system of the health care
sector, therefore as a main fiscal decentralisation variable I have decided to use a dummy
variable (dec) that takes value zero from 1991 to 1997 and value one afterwards which
essentially capture the 1998 tax reform. To capture the effect of the electoral policy
variation I will use a discrete variable that takes value one starting from 1995. For
robustness checks of the measure of fiscal decentralisation two other variables have been
defined: (1) the per capita amount of own regional tax revenues (tax) in real values; (2)
the percentage share of regional own tax with respect to the sum of total current grants
and own tax revenues (dect). Table 1 shows that on average regional tax revenue is more
than 370 euros per capita and accounts for 23% of the total current budget revenue. As
expected, most of the variation is registered across time rather than between regions.
Variables used as non-controllable inputs are: the real GDP per capita (gdp) to control
for the standard of living which provides also a proxy for the level of schooling that was
not available at regional level for the first part of the 90s. As reported in Table 1, the
average per capita GDP is almost 21,000 euros, and most of the variation is registered
between regions rather than across time. In southern regions real income is on average 40%
below that of the rest of the country. Then per capita real household health expenditure
15Two main references that survey the methodologies to estimate the effect of the environmental vari-
ables are Coelli et al. [2005] for DEA models and Kumbhakar and Lovell [2000] for SFM.
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(hexph), that has been introduced to control for the contribution of the private sector
to the health condition of the population. Table 1 reports an average value of 390 euros
and its variation is more or less the same either across time or between regions. Similarly
to the GDP distribution northern regions register the highest values followed by central
and southern regions. And finally the dependency ratio (dep), that corresponds to the
percentage share of the population over 65 and below 14 with respect to the population
between 15 and 64 and accounts for the demand pressure on health services (see Table 1).
An important issue is the possibility that some of these variables can be endogenous.
As already discussed in Section 2, the exogeneity of policy variables is ensured by the fact
that both reforms have been implemented by central government simultaneously in all
regions, i.e. regional governments could not decide independently when to hold elections
or when to decentralise part of the health funding system. Therefore, our measures of
funding decentralisation mainly capture the effect of the central government policy aimed
at reducing the dependence of regions on unconditional grants. As far as non-controllable
inputs are concerned, the set of instrumental variables will include the lagged variable
of each endogenous variable, one period lagged of resident population over 75, and one
period lagged public health expenditure.
5 The empirical model
Regional governments are assumed to produce health care output according to the fol-
lowing production function:
yit = f(xit; β)g(zit; γ)exp(vit − uit) i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., T. (1)
where N is the number of regions, T the number of years, yit the output of the health
care sector, xit is a (L × 1) vector of inputs, zit is a (M × 1) vector of environmental
variables (EVs) , β a vector of technology parameters, γ the vector of EVs coefficients.
For simplicity, and with little loss of generality, we assume a separability between f(.),
which describes the technology of the health care sector, and g(.), which represents the
way in which environment affects the output and, consequently, efficiency. The error term
has two components - the idiosyncratic error vit, which accounts for the statistical noise
in the production function, and the inefficiency error component uit, which is assumend
to satisfy the restriction uit > 0. Finally, indices of efficiency eit, which are specific to
each region and each time period, can be defined as:
eit = exp(−uit) =
yit
f(xit; β)
×
1
g(zit; γ)
×
1
exp(vit)
(2)
where eit is a number between 0 and 1 that corresponds to the reciprocal of the Debreu-
Farrell measure of technical efficiency [Debreu, 1951, Farrell, 1957]. The closer it is to
one, the more efficient the region is.
Depending how f(.) is estimated, it is possible to distinguish between parametric and
non-paremetric approaches. With regards to our assumption about the stochastic com-
ponent of the model (v), it is possible to distinguish between stochastic and deterministic
methods. Panel data stochastic frontier models (SFM) allow for statistical noise, but
are parametric since they require the specification of f(.). Conversely, data envelopment
analysis (DEA) requires no assumption about f(.), but is deterministic, since v is assumed
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to be equal to zero, hence no form of statistical noise or measurement error can be distin-
guished from inefficiency. Therefore, the impact of the two policy variations on regional
government efficiency has been evaluated using both methodologies, thereby testing the
robustness of the results with respect to the assumption behind the two approaches.
Moreover moving g(zit; γ) on the left hand side of (2), and assuming that the stochastic
component can be separated correctly from the inefficiency error component, we can
identify a "gross" index of efficiency e˜it = eitg(zit; γ). This is important, because by
comparing regional rankings obtained using the two indices, it will be possible to derive
further evidence about the way in which the environment affects the performance of
regional governments in the provision of health care services.
Panel data stochastic frontier models
In this framework, the impact of the EVs on regional efficiency can be estimated con-
sistently by specifying the following log-linearised version of the stochastic production
function in equation (1):
log yit =
L∑
l=1
βl log xlit +
M∑
m=1
γm log zmit + ǫit + αi (3)
Where output is measured in terms of life expectancy, the technology of the health care
sector is specified by using a Cobb-Dougals production function with non-neutral tech-
nological change.16 The unobserved heterogeneity αi corresponds to the inefficiency er-
ror component (−uit) averaged across time because we assume fixed effect, and ǫit ∼
i.i.d.(0, σ2ǫ ) accounts for the stochastic component of the model (vit).
The key feature of the panel data SFM approach is the association of the "individual
effect" in the panel data literature with the "inefficiency error term". How this association
is formulated distinguishes the fixed effect model (FE), the benchmark model due to the
reduced number of assumptions required for consistency, from the random effect model
(RE).17
Given the foregoing, let us consider in more detail the FE SFM first. Owing to the long
panel structure of the dataset - which means that the asymptotic properties will be based
only on the number of periods - the unobserved heterogeneity across regions (αi) can be
treated parametrically, including a set of regional-specific dummies. The main advantage
of doing so is to avoid a distributional assumption, as well as problems of correlation
with the other regressors. Consequently least square dummy variables (LSDV) is the
simplest consistent estimator (equivalent to within the group estimator). Coefficients’
point estimates for the EVs and the input variables are displayed in column (3) of Table
4 where the set of instrumental variables that were described in the previous section is
used if the hypothesis of exogeneity for the EVs is rejected. In that case, LSDV estimator
is replaced by generalized method of moments estimator (GMM).
Regional dummies αi can be normalised in order to derive a time-invariant index of
"net" technical efficiency eSFMi ∈ [0, 1] that provides a relative evaluation of regional
efficiency, after taking the effect of the environment into account, comparing each region
16This implies the inclusion of a linear trend ad its interaction with the inputs.
17Stochastic frontier models have been developed simultaneously by Aigner et al. [1977] and Meeusen
and van den Broeck [1977], a complete survey about panel data models is provided by Kumbhakar and
Lovell [2000].
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with the most efficient one.18 Given the impossibility of introducing time variations, eSFMi
can be interpreted to be the average level of "net" efficiency attained by each regional
government between 1991 and 2005. Although, in the literature concerning SFM, there is
a variety of methods to include time variation in the efficiency error component (see, for
example, Coelli et al. [2005] and Kumbhakar and Lovell [2000]) in the case of FE SFM,
it is not possible to distinguish between technical change and time variation in efficiency
because two different trends cannot be identified. Then, the inclusion of years dummies
among the regressors is not feasible, since that would generate an incidental parameter
problem.
In conclusion, when the assumption of independence between the inefficiency error
term and the other regressors, as well as the assumptions about the distributions of
the two error components are tenable - assumptions that are not required in case of FE
model - it would be possible to consistently estimate an RE SFM. This last kind of model,
however, will play only a minor role here as we do not need to identify the effect of time
invariant inputs or time invariant environmental variables. Nevertheless, a random effect
configuration of the model in (3) has been estimated following the methodology suggested
by Battese and Coelli [1995]. Although the results are very similar (compare columns 3
and 4 of Table 4), the fixed-effect configuration is more reliable since the validity of the
additional assumptions required for the consistency of the random effect specification has
been rejected.19
Data envelopment analysis
In the case of DEA, since no assumption are made about the functional form of f(.), the
impact of EVs on efficiency has been estimated following a two-stage procedure.20 In the
18As underlined by Schmidt and Sickles [1984] as T → ∞ and N is fixed, like in this case, we can
consistently separate the overall intercept from the one-sided individual effect, which provides only the
measure of efficiency relative to an absolute standard represented by the most efficient region in the
sample that will have eSFM
i
= 1. Only when also N →∞ estimates of ui are fully consistent and can be
interpreted also as cardinal measure of efficiency.
19Consistency of the MLE used to estimate the RE model hinges on two main assumptions: indepen-
dence between the inefficiency error term and the inputs, and the correct specification of the distributions
of the inefficiency error term and the stochastic error component assumed, respectively, truncated-normal
and normal. As proposed by Schmidt and Sickles [1984], these two joint hypotheses could be tested by a
Hausman test based on the difference between the MLE and the GMM estimator. According to the result
of this test, reported at the end of Tables 4, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of consistency of the
MLE but only at 10% significance level. We are at the border of the rejection area and it is not possible
to gain a clear understanding about the validity of the two assumptions. Moreover it is important to
notice that in case of RE SFM the assumption of exogeneity of EVs comes implicitly by the assumption
of independence between the two error component since the RE model developed by Battese and Coelli
[1995] includes EVs directly in the specification of the mean of u.
20One of the first application of this procedure was that of Timmer [1971] in an attempt to explain
interstate variation in technical efficiency in US agriculture. A two-stage approach has been used also
by McCarty and Yaisawarng [1993] to investigate efficiency in New Jersey public school districts. Wor-
thington and Dollery [2002] compare different methods to account for the effect of EVs on the efficiency
of 73 New South Wales local governments in Australia. Afonso and Aubyn [2006] considered a two-stage
approach in relation to the health production process of OECD countries by regressing efficiency scores
on EVs like GDP per head, education level, and health behaviour (such as obesity and smoking habits).
Recently Adam et al. [2008] have used the same methodology to estimate the effect of decentralisation
on the efficiency of the public sector using a panel of 21 OECD countries over the period 1997 to 2000
(this is typical example where the EV is represented by a policy institution).
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first stage, linear programming is used to compute a "gross" index of efficiency e˜DEAit since
the EVs are not taken into account. In particular, let φ∗it be the solution of the following
linear program:21
max
φ,λ
φit s.t. xit > Xtλ; ytλ > φyit; λ > 0; ι
′λ = 1. (4)
Then, e˜DEAit = 1/φ
∗
it, in order to be a number constrained between 0 and 1.
22 This is
again an index of relative efficiency because each region is assessed in relation to the best
observed practice in the sample.
Since regional governments, as producers of public goods,23 have more control of out-
put than of inputs, efficiency is evaluated by the "output approach", i.e. each regional
government is considered to be a decision making unit that operates to maximise its
health output, given a fixed amount of inputs. To take into account the effect of the
technical change, a panel approach has been followed. This means that the constrained
maximisation in (4) has been solved N ×T times, so that each input-output combination
is assessed only in relation to the production frontier related to a specific year. In this
way, the effect due to the technical change that shifts the production frontier across time
is neutralised.
Subsequently, in order to assess the impact of EVs on efficiency, in the second stage
the fixed effect panel data model in (5) is estimated, where e˜DEAit is regressed upon the
EVs.
e˜DEAit = h(zit; γ;αi) + ǫit (5)
Where ǫit ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ
2
ǫ ). Owing to the long panel structure of the dataset, the unobserved
heterogeneity across regions (αi) can be treated parametrically, including a set of regional-
specific dummies. Assuming linearity (h(zit; γ;αi) = z
′
itγ + αi), LSDV is the simplest
consistent estimator. On the other hand, this assumption may not be appropriate as
the dependent variable can vary only between zero and one. A possible solution is to
assume that h(zit; γ;αi) = Φ(zit; γ;αi) where Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function so that the fitted values of the efficiency scores will neither exceed 1
nor be less than 0. Under the assumption of non-linearity, the model can be estimated by
a pooled Bernoulli quasi-MLE (QMLE) as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge [2008].24
Coefficients’ point estimates for the EVs are displayed in column (1) and (2) of Table 4,
for the linear and non-linear case respectively. The results are very similar and, in the
21In (4) xit is a (L×1) vector of input of region i at time t, Xt is a (L×N) matrix of inputs of all
regions, yt is a (1×N) vector of outputs of all regions, λ is a (N×1) vector of optimal weights attached to
the peers of regions i; ι is a (N×1) vector of ones, the last constraint is important for imposing variable
returns to scale.
22A complete survey about DEA is provided by Ali and Seiford [1993].
23Here public goods refers also to "rival" and/or "excludable" goods like health care that have a strong
social impact.
24Most of the empirical works (for example, Goudriaan and de Groot [1991], Bjurek et al. [1992],
McCarty and Yaisawarng [1993], Lovell et al. [1993], Borger et al. [1994], Vitalianno [1998], and more
recently Afonso and Aubyn [2006]) that use a two-stage approach usually account for the fractional nature
of the depended variable using a Tobit model in the second-stage regression (one-limit or two-limits). The
only case similar to Bernoulli quasi-MLE has been found in Worthington [1999], who uses a second-stage
logistic model. Essentially, as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge [2008], the possible choice of a two-
limit Tobit model for the second-stage regression is not suitable in this contest because, although our
response variable is bounded from below by zero, there are no observations at zero.
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case of endogeneity, the set of instrumental variables discussed in the previous section has
been used. For computational reasons, a two-stage least square estimator will be used in
two steps in the case of the non linear model. Consequently, standard errors need to be
corrected (see Papke and Wooldridge [2008]). In contrast, the linear model is estimated
by GMM in place of LSDV.
Finally, as proved in the appendix, regional dummies can be normalised in order
to derive a "net" index of technical efficiency eDEAi , a number between 0 and 1 that
provides a relative evaluation of regional efficiency after taking into account the effect of
the environment. Since we assume a fixed effect and the inclusion of time dummies would
generate an incidental parameter problem, eDEAi is time invariant and can be interpreted as
the average level of "net" efficiency that is attained by each regional government between
1991 and 2005. The same comments that we made in relation to eSFMi are valid here.
Comparison across different measures of efficiency
Regions’ rankings obtained using eDEAi and e
SFM
i can be compared in order to evaluate
how results might be affected by the the specification of f(.) in the case of SFM, and by the
omission of statistical noise in the case of DEA. To provide further evidence in this sense
the FE SFM in (3) has been estimated without EVs so that normalised regional dummies
can be used as new "gross" index of technical efficiency e˜SFMi ∈ [0, 1] comparable, in terms
of regions’ rankings, with e˜DEAit derived by DEA where no assumption are made about
the shape of f(.).25
Moreover, comparing regions’ rankings within each model, between index typologies
(between e˜DEAit and e˜
DEA
i , or between e
SFM
i and e˜
SFM0
i ), provides some evidence of how
the environment affects efficiency of regional governments. A substantial divergence in
the order of the regions means that the environment affects their performance differently.
Divergence in regions’ rankings would be evidence that some regions, those who lose
positions in terms of "net" efficiency, are characterised by a better environment than
those who gain positions in "net" efficiency.
Table 2: Relation between efficiency indices.
Gross index Net index
DEA e˜DEAit e
DEA
i
SFM FE model e˜SFMi e
SFM
i
Note: only e˜DEAit is time-variant, therefore analysis of technical efficiency across time
can be done only in case of the semi-parametric approach. (see Figure 4).
In the end, as reported in Table 2, four types of efficiency indices can be used to rank
regional governments. The "gross index" is computed for each model without controlling
for the environment. Instead, the "net index" is computed once the environment’s effect
has been evaluated by introducing EVs to the model. It is important to stress that all
indices provide only a relative evaluation of efficiency comparing each region with the best
25Coefficients’ point estimates for this second version of the Fixed Effect SFM are displayed in Table
5, where the set of instrumental variables discussed in Section 4 has been used to take into account the
endogeneity of inputs, and the model has been estimated by GMM, instead of the LSDV estimator.
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practice standard represented by the most efficient region. Therefore the only meaningful
comparison is among regions’ rankings reported in Table 3.
6 Analysis of the results
As reported in Table 4, 1998 tax reform exhibits the expected positive effect on government
efficiency with both approaches, but coefficients’ estimates are statistically different frorm
zero (at a 1% significance level) only in the case of the stochastic frontier models. The
1995 electoral reform exhibits a stronger positive impact on government efficiency as its
coefficients’ estimates have a positive sign and are statistically different from zero at a
1% significance level in all models but the RE SFM. Moreover, the coefficients of the two
policy variations are always jointly statistically different from zero at a 1% significance
level. Finally, results obtained by DEA are very robust to the choice of the output
variable as reported in Table 6 where the health care output is measured in terms of
neonatal mortality.26
The small magnitude of the coefficients in Table 4 is quite misleading because it is
a result of the high absolute level of efficiency reported in the health care sector, that
in turn is mainly a consequence of the small variation (especially between the regions)
registered in life expectancy at birth employed to measure the output of the sector. In
fact, the impact of the two policy variations equal to 0.02% and 0.43%, respectively for
the 1998 tax reform and the 1995 ballot (see column (1) of Table 4), is much greater than
it might appear considering that the range of variations of DEA efficiency scores, reported
in Figure 4 (a), is between 1 and 0.98 which corresponds only to 2% of the entire range.
Similarly, in case of SFM, the partial effect reported in our estimates, according to
which life expectancy (and also efficiency) increased by 0.40% after the 1995 ballot and
by 0.30% after the introduction of IRAP (see column (3) of Table 4) is not so small
considering that life expectancy exhibits an overall standard deviation equal to one year
and six moths around a mean of 79 years.27
Foregoing remarks are confirmed by the fact that coefficients exhibit a bigger magni-
tude in Table 6 where health care output is measured in terms of neonatal mortality, that
showed more variability among regions (see Table 1).
Figure 4 plots the average gross DEA efficiency scores by macro-regions (on the left
the output is measured in life expectancy, on the right in neonatal mortality). As noticed
above, in general, the health care sector appears to be very efficient, since indices are very
close to one. However, this would be an incorrect conclusion, since this result is driven
mainly by the fact that both output measures exhibit small variations among regions. In
fact, in the case of neonatal mortality, where we register a slightly more intense "between"
variation (see Table 1), the health care sector appears to be less efficient. However, this is
not a problem because our main interest is in using these indices of efficiency to compare
values by region and time and not to assess efficiency in absolute terms.
26As explained in Section 4, in the case of SFM only life expectancy has been used as a dependent
variable because the heavy parametrization of the trans-log production function required in the case of
neonatal mortality is not compatible with the sample size.
27It is important to stress that we have found no significant difference in the effect of the policy variables
across regions by grouping them into the three geographical macro regions (north, centre, south). This
evidence of uniform effect, however, might be driven by the small sample size.
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Figure 4: DEA "gross" technical efficiency indices (e˜DEAit ), average across macro-regions
(n = notrh, c = centre, s = south), year 1991-2005.
In general, without taking into account the effect of the environment, and indepen-
dently of the output measure a clear increase in inefficiency is observed after 1995, but
no particular change in the efficiency path is registered after 1998. Moreover, in terms of
"gross" indices of efficiency, southern regions28 appear to be less efficient than the rest of
the country as reported also in Table 3. On the other hand, especially in case of SFM,
the change observed in regions’ ranking shows that the environment plays a role in the
evaluation of the relative performance.
In order to viualize this, let us consider Table 3 where the Spearman index between
e˜SFAi and e
SFA
i equal to 0.56, much lower than the 0.825 obtained by comparing the gross
and net indices in the case of DEA. Therefore we can also conclude that the SFM attach
a slightly different effect to the environment than the two-stage approach.
Comparison of regions’ rankings across different models provides a further external
validity test for the results: the Spearman index between e˜SFAi and
∑T
t=1 e˜
DEA
i /T is equal
to 0.87 and is statistically significant at 1%, net indices exhibit less similarity highlighted
by a Spearman index between eSFAi and e
DEA
i equal to 0.67 but it is still positive and
statistically significant at 1%.
This last evidence as well as the stability of the results across different models cor-
roborate the Cobb-Doublas choice for the specification of the production function, and
at the same time show that most of the deviation from the frontier is due to inefficiency
rather than to statistical noise.
7 Conclusions
The contributions of this paper are twofold. Firstly, it provides an empirical analysis
of the impact that the 1995 renewal of regional political institutions and the 1998 tax
reform might have had on the efficiency of Italian regional governments. This is the first
28Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria.
17
Francesco Porcelli - Decentralisation and government efficiency. Evidence form the Italian health care sector. 18
Table 3: Regional health system rankings according to average technical efficiency indices,
year 1991 and 2005.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Stochastic Frontier Model (SFM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PT
t=1 e˜
DEA
i /T = DEA in-
dex of technical efficiency,
average across years)
eDEAi = DEA net index
of technical efficiency (non-
linear second stage model)
e˜FEi = Fixed Effect
Stochastic Frontier Model
index of technical efficiency
eFEi = Fixed Effect
Stochastic Frontier Model
net index of technical
efficiency
(c) Marche (c) Marche (c) Marche (c) Marche
(n) Veneto (c) Umbria (c) Umbria (c) Toscana
(n) Lombardia (n) Veneto (n) Emilia Romagna (c) Abruzzo
(c) Umbria (c) Lazio (n) Veneto (c) Umbria
(n) Emilia Romagna (c)Toscana (c) Toscana (n) Veneto
(c) Lazio (n) Emilia Romagna (c) Abruzzo (s) Calabria
(c) Toscana (c) Abruzzo (n) Lombardia (s) Puglia
(c) Abruzzo (s) Molise (s) Puglia (s) Basilicata
(n) Piemonte (n) Lombardia (c) Lazio (s) Molise
(s) Molise (s) Puglia (n) Piemonte (n) Emilia Romagna
(n) Liguria (s) Calabria (n) Liguria (c) Lazio
(s) Puglia (n) Liguria (s) Molise (n) Lombardia
(s) Basilicata (s) Basilicata (s) Campania (n) Piemonte
(s) Calabria (n) Piemonte (s) Calabria (n) Liguria
(s) Campania (s) Campania (s) Basilicata (s) Campania
n = north, c = centre, s = south.
Spearman index
PT
t=1 e˜
DEA
i /T vs e
DEA
i = 0.8250 (prob > |t| = 0.0000)
Spearman index e˜FEi vs e
FE
i = 0.56 (prob > |t| = 0.0000)
Spearman index
PT
t=1 e˜
DEA
i /T vs e˜
FE
i = 0.87 (prob > |t| = 0.0000)
Spearman index eDEAi vs e
FE
i = 0.67 (prob > |t| = 0.0000)
time that this issue has been addressed using Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic
Frontier Models.29
As discussed in the previous section it seems that only the 1995 political renewal
unambiguously fostered electoral accountability in such a way to stimulate government
efficiency. Whereas 1998 tax reform exhibited a weak and ambiguous positive impact on
efficiency suggesting that the little opportunity regional governments had to set regional
tax rates (see Section 2) might have not generated neither yardstick competition nor tax
competition required to stimulate electoral accountability. In further empirical analysis,
therefore, it would be interesting to evaluate the impact that 1995 political renewal might
have had on the level of corruption as well as the impact that 1998 reform might have
had on yardstick and tax competition among regional governments.
Secondly, the paper provides an analysis of technical efficiency in the health care
sector between 1991 and 2005. In general, without taking into accout the effect of the
29Recently Mapelli [2007] provides a detailed analysis of the Italian health care system assessing regional
performances by a complex system of indicators between 1995 and 2005.
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environment, southern regions are less efficient than the rest of the country. Moreover,
by comparing regional rankings that are obtained using "gross indices" of efficiency with
those obtained considering "net indices" of efficiency - by which we evaluate regional
performance controlling for the effect of environmental variables - we observe that some
regions rise from the bottom of the table to the top, whereas others do the opposite (see
Table 3).
One explanation for this result is that the poor performance of regions for which
placement improves when we control for the effect of the environment may be due to
circumstances that the regional governments are unable to control. In the case of those
regions that continue to remain at the bottom of the table, there is evidence that poor
performance is more directly a consequence of low efficiency in the provision of the health
care services. Therefore, a key strategy for improving the performance of those regions
that substantially raised their performance rankings could be to first address problems,
such as the low levels of income, and then the government’s inefficient management of the
resources (e.g., Puglia). Conversely, with regard to those regions that continue to remain
at the bottom of the table when controlling for the environment effect (e.g., Campania),
the poor performance is a symptom of a severe problem in the management of resources.
In such cases, the poor performance of the government should be the first point on the
agenda of reforms necessary to improve efficiency (see Table 3).
Many improvements and extensions are still possible. For example, in order to strengthen
the validity of the results, it would be advisable to estimate a cost frontier model that,
unlike the production frontier, permits multiple outputs. Moreover, a cost frontier model
will also provide a measure of "economic efficiency", thereby expanding the evaluation
of efficiency to include the financial aspects of the system. On the other hand, with re-
spect to production frontier models, the main limitation of cost frontier models is in the
higher quality, and greater quantity of data required. Therefore a bigger sample size is
the prerequisite condition for a more precise analysis, that can be achieved only by using
micro-data at the level of local health authorities or hospitals.
Finally, a major pitfall of the panel data stochastic frontier model approach is that both
RE and FE models force any time invariant cross unit heterogeneity into the same term
used to capture the inefficiency. Therefore, there is a risk of picking up "unobserved het-
erogeneity" in addition to, or even instead of, inefficiency. A substantial extension would
be necessary in order to tackle this issue. For example, one of the solutions suggested by
Greene [2005] is a modified version of the traditional fixed effect stochastic fronter model,
called the "true fix effect" model. However, this is an extreme solution that generates, in
some senses, a diametrically-opposed, new problem since no time invariant factors in this
model will affect the inefficiency error component at all.
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Appendix
In order to show how, in case of panel data, the second stage can be used to derived a
"net" index of efficiency we can start from the deterministic version of the frontier model
in (1) in case of cross-section:
yi = f(xi; β)g(zi; γ)exp(−ψi) i = 1, 2, ..., N. (6)
where zi is a vector of environmental variables, γ is the vector of EVs coefficients, and
exp(−ψi) ≃ e
DEA
i . The second-stage regression can be derived by rearranging (6) in (7):
exp(−ψi) =
yi
f(xi; β)
1
g(zi; γ)
(7)
where
yi
f(xi; β)
≃ e˜DEAi , therefore (7) becomes:
eDEAi ≃ e˜
DEA
i
1
g(zi; γ)
(8)
Finally, since eDEAi is not observed and e˜
DEA
i comes from the first stage DEA, rearranging
equation (8) we obtain the second-stage general empirical model in the case of the cross-
section:
e˜DEAi = g(zi; γ)e
DEA
i + ǫi (9)
where ǫi is a zero mean idiosyncratic error term. The linear version of the second-stage
empirical model in (9) is:
e˜DEAi = z
′
iγ + αi + ǫi (10)
Since αi ≃ e
DEA
i is not observed it will form a composite error term with ǫi:
ξi = ui + ǫi (11)
and the model in (10) becomes:
e˜DEAi = z
′
iγ + ξi (12)
as a result, in (12), E[zi|ξi] 6= 0 ∀i unless efficiency will not be influenced by the envi-
ronment, something that Ray [1988] did not notice in the first specification of the second
stage regression in case of DEA. If we have access to panel data (like in this case), one
way to deal with the endogeneity of EVs in (12) would be the specification of a Fixed
Effect model where point estimates of the individual dummies can be used to derive eDEAi .
Under this assumption (12) becomes:
e˜DEAit = z
′
itγ + αi + ǫit i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., T. (13)
and αi can be normalised in the following way in order to constrain e
DEA
i between 0 and
1.
eDEAi = exp[αi −max(αi)] (14)
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Table 4: Environmental variables’ point estimates (output = life expectancy at birth).
DEA second stage models Stochastic frontier models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MODEL Linear Non-linear
(AvgMargEff)1
FE SFM RE SFM
ESTIMATOR GMM QMLE GMM MLE
Dip. Variable e˜DEA e˜DEA log of Life
expect.
log of Life
expect.
fiscal decentralisation dummy (dect−1) 0.0223 0.0199 0.2891
∗∗ 0.6424∗∗
(0.0816) (0.0956) (0.0850) (0.3241)
electoral dummy (electt−1) 0.4280
∗∗ 0.5749∗∗ 0.3855∗∗ 0.3595
(0.1003) (0.0839) (0.0798) (0.2763)
H0: (dec elect) = 0, χ
2(2) 19.45∗∗ 47.97∗∗ 25.39∗∗ 24.78∗∗
σ2
v−u
0.0028∗∗
(0.0004)
σ2
u
/ σ2
v−u
54.7487∗∗
(6.2411)
gdpit (log per capita real gdp) 0.8668 0.5576 1.2424 1.3895
∗
(1.2004) (1.0993) (1.2437) (0.7590)
depit (dependancy ratio) -0.0525 -0.0767 0.0956 0.1240
∗∗
(0.0537) (0.0605) (0.0723) (0.0241)
hexphit (log housholds per capita real health expenditure) -0.8531 −0.8655
∗ 0.1438 0.7850
(0.4514) (0.4169) (0.2953) (0.7190)
rgdpit residuals from the reduced form of gdp −2.4091
(2.0107)
rdepit residuals from the reduced form of dep 0.1576
∗
(0.0698)
rhexphit residuals from the reduced form of hexph 1.7401
∗
(0.7571)
H0: (rgdp, rdep, rhexph) = 0 =⇒ H0: (gdp, dep, hexph) are
exogenous, χ2(3)
11.30∗∗
Robust Hausman test, H0: exogeneity [p-val of χ
2(.)] [0.0457] [0.0565]
Hansen J stat. χ2(.), H0: valid instruments. [p-val of χ
2(.)] [0.3404] [0.1695]
Anderson canon.corr. LR stat., H0: weak instr. [p-val of χ
2(.)] [0.0000] [0.0057]
Pagan Hall heterosk. test, H0: homosk. [p-val of χ
2(.)] [0.0133] [0.8981]
Sceond Hausman test, H0: RE model is consistent [p-val of χ
2(.)] [0.0893]
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes No
No. of observations (N = 15, T = 14) 210 210 210 210
a) Robust standard errors in brackets () * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
b) Point estimates are in percentage values, and standard errors are × 100.
c) In case of the non-linear model in column (2) the null of exogeneity for gdp, dep, and hexph is tested using a joint likelihood ratio test on
the significance of the residuals rgdp, rdep, and rhexph form the the reduced forms of each endogenous variable.
d) In case of the linear models in columns (1) and (3) the null of exogeneity for gdp, dep, and hexph is tested using a robust Hausman test,
the Hansen J statistics is used to test the null of exogeneity for the instrumental variables, and the Anderson canonical correlation provides
a test for the correlation between instruments and endogenous variables. Finally, the Pagan-Hall test rejects the null of homoscedastic variance
only for the model in column (1), which justifies the use of robust standard errors.
e) In case of RE SFM the ratio σ2
u
/σ2
v−u
reports how much of the variance of the composite error is generated by the inefficiency error
component. It corresponds to 55% of the whole variance and is statistically significant at 1%. If it were not statistically different from zero,
the efficiency analysis would not have been meaningful.
Note: 1. In column (2) coefficients estimates are reported in terms of average partial effect.
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Table 5: Production function without environmental variables, point estimates (output
= life expectancy at birth).
MODEL Fixed Effect
ESTIMATOR GMM
Dip. Variable log of life expectancy
linear trend (year) 0.3906 ∗∗
(0.0225)
non-neutral technological trend (year ∗ inpit) 0.0003
(0.0010)
non-neutral technological trend (year ∗ inp2it) -0.0041∗∗
(0.0012)
no. of outpatient clinics and laboratories / 100000 inhabitants (inpit) 0.0197
(0.0124)
no. of emergency services / 100000 inhabitants (inp2it) 0.1765
(0.1427)
H0: (inp, inp3) = 0, χ2(2) 7.81∗∗
H0: (inp+ inp3) = 1, χ2(1) 5.3e+05∗∗
H0: (yearinp, yearinp3) = 0, χ2(2) 22.84∗∗
Robust Hausman test, H0: exogeneity [p-val of χ2(4)] [0.0006]
Hansen J stat. χ2(.), H0: valid instruments. [p-val of χ2(2)] [0.4075]
Anderson canon.corr. LR stat., H0: weak instr. [p-val of χ2(3)] [0.0313]
Pagan Hall heterosk. test, H0: homosk. [p-val of χ2(28)] [0.3573]
Regional dummies Yes
No. of bservations (N = 15, T = 14) 210
a) Robust standard errors in brackets (), * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
b) Point estimates are in percentage values, and standard errors are × 100.
c) Inputs are in levels and not in log form since are ratios.
d) The model production function exhibits decreasing return to scale since we can reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficients of the two inputs are equal to one. Then parameters of the two inputs are jointly statistically different from
zero at 1% significance level, as well as those related to the non-neutral technological trend.
e) The small magnitude of the coefficients is mainly driven by the fact that the output is measured in terms of life
expectancy. In fact, as reported in Table 1, the overall standard deviation, equal to one year and six months, is much smaller
than its mean, equal to 79 years. Therefore it makes sense, according to our estimates, that if we increased the outpatient
clinic ratio by one, for example, life expectancy would have increased by 0.02% other things being equal.
f) The Pagan-Hall test does not reject the null of homoscedasticity. Then according to the "robust" version of the
Hausman test, we can reject the null of exogeneity for the input variables at 1%, the Hansen J statistics
do not reject the null of valid instruments, which means that our instrumental variables are not correlated with the error
term, and finally according to the Anderson canonical correlation instruments are instead correlated with the input variables.
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Table 6: Environmental variables’ point estimates (output = neonatal mortality index).
DEA second stage models
(1) (2)
MODEL Linear Non-linear
(AvgMargEff)1
ESTIMATOR GMM QMLE
Dip. Variable e˜DEA e˜DEA
fiscal decentralisation dummy (dect−1) 0.6001 0.3150
(0.8700) (0.8884)
electoral dummy (electt−1) 4.9491∗∗ 5.2908∗∗
(0.9566) (0.6701)
H0: (dec elect) = 0, χ2(2) 23.53∗∗ 43.08∗∗
gdpit (log per capita real gdp) -20.4691 -19.0104
(11.6693) (10.2153)
depit (dependancy ratio) -0.0509 -0.0391
(0.2928) (0.2915)
hexphit (log housholds per capita real health expenditure) -6.4280 -5.7251
(3.3513) (2.9311)
rgdpit residuals from the reduced form of gdp -21.2046
(21.2890)
rdepit residuals from the reduced form of dep 1.8724
(1.0022)
rhexphit residuals from the reduced form of hexph -8.3128
(8.8588)
H0: (rgdp, rdep, rhexph) = 0 =⇒ H0: (gdp, dep, hexph) are exogenous, χ2(3) 4.94
Robust Hausman test, H0: exogeneity [p-val of χ2(.)] [0.2820]
Hansen J stat. χ2(.), H0: valid instruments. [p-val of χ2(.)] [0.3103]
Anderson canon.corr. LR stat., H0: weak instr. [p-val of χ2(.)] [0.0000]
Pagan Hall heterosk. test, H0: homosk. [p-val of χ2(.)] [0.0019]
Regional dummies Yes Yes
No. of observations (N = 15, T = 14) 210 210
a) Robust standard errors in brackets () * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
b) Point estimates are in percentage values, and standard errors are × 100.
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